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And I say also unto thee, 
Thou art Peter, 
And upon this rock  
I will build my church;  
And the gates of hell  
Shall not prevail against it. 
Mt. 16:18 (Holy Bible, 2006: 10) 
 
ABSTRACT: This article examines the constitutional interactions between transition governance 
and leadership in shaping innovative designs for complex societies. When assessing institutional 
innovation, state constitutions reveal a great deal of variation: democratic designs take extremely 
differentiated forms according to different constitutional contexts. This is why this article focuses on 
the theoretical conceptions of democracy, as they are contextualised in different constitutional 
designs. It begins with three quotations (from the Holy Bible, the European Union’s admission 
criteria, a report by the World Bank) that provide us with paradigms for institutional innovation and 
governance in times of transition, while also shedding light on the concepts of ‘democracy’, 
‘leadership’, and ‘transition’. To this extent, the essay examines alternative types of democracy 
(deliberative, conversational, representative, economic) in order to fill in the gaps within liberal 
democratic designs. Among them, economic democracy profoundly affects constitutional designs. 
This means that, in a globalised economic world, constitutional contexts act as mere recipients of 
changes promoted by the dominance of international actors that have neither democratic nor 
popular legitimacy  
KEYWORDS: Constitutional democracy; Constitutionalism; Representative democracy; 
Deliberative democracy; Economic democracy; Constitutional transitions; Transition governance; 
Leadership; Constitutional context. 
SUMMARY: I. SETTING THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
IMPLICATIONS OF LEADERSHIP AND INNOVATIVE INSTITUTIONS. - II. FROM 
CONSTITUTIONAL TO THEORETICAL DEMOCRACY: COMPARATIVE STUDIES AND 
INNOVATIVE INSTITUTIONS. - III. COMPARATIVE LEGAL STUDIES, THEORETICAL 
FRAMEWORK, AND PARADIGMS OF INSTITUTIONAL INNOVATION. - IV. TYPES OF 
DEMOCRACIES, THE ROLE OF THE LEADERSHIP, TYPES OF TRANSITIONS. - 1. What is 
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hinted at in the gospel paradigm? Liberal democracy as the type of democracy. - 2. Which role for 
leadership in the gospel paradigm? - 3. Which kind of transition? - V. THE REASON FOR 
INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE: FROM RATIONAL DICHOTOMY TO PLURAL DEMOCRACIES. - VI. 
NEW PATTERNS FOR INSTITUTIONAL INNOVATION: SOCIAL AND CONVERSATIONAL 
DEMOCRACY. - VII. UNDERMINING DEMOCRATIC INNOVATION: STANDARDS, ECONOMIC 
DEMOCRACY, AND EXTERNAL LEADERSHIP PROMOTING SOCIAL CHANGE. - VIII. THE 
LEXICON OF DEMOCRACY AND ITS CONSTITUTIONAL UPHEAVAL: TOWARDS A 
UNIVERSAL ECONOMIC DEMOCRATIC LANGUAGE? 
 
IMPLICACIONES CONSTITUCIONALES DE LA DEMOCRACIA Y GOBIERNO 
DE SOCIEDADES COMPLEJAS 
RESUMEN: El artículo aborda la relación, de transcendencia constitucional, entre transiciones 
democráticas y leadership a la hora de delinear marcos institucionales novedosos para el gobierno 
de sociedades complejas. A este respeto, las constituciones estatales manifiestan una gran 
variedad de formas de institutional innovation. Por esta razón el artículo se centra sobre las 
concepciones de democracia, para luego examinar su concrección en los diferentes contextos 
constitucionales. El artículo empieza profundizando el significado de tres citas (una de la Biblia, 
una relativa a los criterios de adhesión a la Unión Europea, una sacada de un report del Banco 
Mundial), que enuncian paradigmas de institutional innovation y governance en épocas de 
transición y, en el mismo tiempo, son esclarecedoras de los conceptos de ‘democracias’, 
‘liderazgo’ y ‘transición’. El artículo examina luego distintos modelos de democracia (deliberativa, 
conversacional, representativa, económica) que complementan el clásico modelo de democracia 
liberal. Sin embargo, el concepto de economic democracy es el que más afecta los contextos 
constitucionales. En un mundo que ya está completamente globalizado a nivel económico, los 
contextos constitucionales se limitan a registrar pasivamente cambios institucionales promovidos 
por actores internacionales que no tienen legitimación democrática ni popular. 
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Membership requires that the candidate country has achieved stability of institutions 
guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of 
minorities, the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope 
with competitive pressure and market force within the Union. Membership presupposes 
the candidate’s ability to take on the obligations of membership including adherence to 
the aims of political, economic and monetary union. 
(European Council, 1993) 
Underlying the litany of Africa’s development problem is a crisis of governance. By 
governance is meant the exercise of political power to manage a nation’s affairs. Because 
countervailing power has been lacking, state officials in many countries have served their 
own interests without fear of being called to account. In self-defense individuals have built 
up personal networks of influence … [P]olitics becomes personalized, and patronage 
becomes essential to maintain power. The leadership assumes broad discretionary 
authority and loses its legitimacy. Information is controlled, and voluntary associations are 
co-opted or disbanded. This environment cannot readily support a dynamic economy. At 
worst the state becomes coercive and arbitrary. … [D]edicated leadership can produce a 
quite different outcome. It requires a systematic effort to build a pluralistic institutional 
structure, a determination to respect the rule of law, and vigorous protection of the 
freedom of the press and human rights.  
(World Bank, 1989: 60-61) 
 
I. SETTING THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
IMPLICATIONS OF LEADERSHIP AND INNOVATIVE INSTITUTIONS 
Scholars with a background in either law or political science may consider unusual the 
choice to begin an essay on governance, complex societies, and innovative institutions 
by quoting the Holy Bible, the admission criteria to the EU, and a World Bank report on 
sub-Saharan Africa. 
They might also consider bizarre the idea of examining transition governance in a 
complex world by making reference to these extremely differentiated sources. And their 
criticism might not only be procedural but also substantive. It is not just a matter of 
quotations, they might argue, but, they would probably also ask themselves whether and 
how these texts and documents could really contribute to an analysis of the topic in 
question. 
On the contrary, I contend that the lines quoted at the beginning of the essay are 
extremely useful when addressing the constitutional implications of the interactions 
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between governance, complex societies, and the role of leadership in shaping innovative 
institutional designs. To this extent, this essay has primarily speculative aims.
1
 Indeed, it 
is aimed at assessing the impact of the “controversial’” conceptions of democracy
2
 that 
support the adoption of innovative institutional designs in constitutional liberal 
democracies. 
I will not concentrate on the multifarious constitutional features that characterise each 
specific constitutional legal system, where the governance of societal complexity requires 
innovative institutions. Although they vary from state to state, these features serve a 
unitary function that embraces all constitutional contexts and designs. This is apparent in 
the field of comparative constitutional legal studies, which focuses on how and to what 
extent each country implements the conception of constitutional democracy. This is due 
to the fact that, “in large measure, the notion of a common point of departure seems 
inherent in the process of comparison”
3
. 
In particular, domestic constitutional features may be considered as constitutional 
reflections of broader theoretical conceptions of democracy, and the latter have proven to 
be capable of shaping the complex and multifarious relations between society, 
leadership, transition, and innovation within specific constitutional contexts. 
This essay thus provides a scenario for a broader examination of current trends in 
comparative constitutional studies. It is evident that globalisation, on the one hand, and 
global financial dominance, on the other, have profound impacts upon domestic socio-
                                                          
1
 Speculative aims are the primary purposes of this method, which falls under the umbrella of 
comparative legal studies. On knowledge and understanding as primary purposes of comparative 
law see, among others, J.-L. Constantinesco, Rechtsvergleichung, Bd. 2: Die rechtsvergleichende 
Methode, Carl Heymans, Cologne, 1972; K. Zweigert and H. Kötz, An Introduction to Comparative 
Law. Third edition translated by Tony Weir, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1998; L. Pegoraro, “The 
Comparative Method and Constitutional Legal Science: New Trends”, in A. Mordechai Rabello and 
Zanotti, A. (eds.), Development in European, Italian and Israeli Law, Giuffrè, Milan, 2001, p. 117; M. 
Siems, Comparative Law, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2014, p. 2 et seq., 22; J. Husa, A New 
Introduction to Comparative Law, Bloomsbury, Oxford and Portland (OR), 2014, p. 59 et seq. 
2
 See Z. Motala, Constitutional Options for a Democratic South Africa: A Comparative 
Perspective, Howard University Press, Washington, D.C., 1994, p. 19. On democracy see, among 
others, G. Burdeau, La démocratie. Essai synthétique, Office de Pubblicité, Brussels, 1956. For an 
assessment of the different conceptions of democracy see M. Kurki, “Democracy and Conceptual 
Contestability: Reconsidering Conceptions of Democracy in Democracy Promotion”, International 
Studies Review, n° 12, 2010, pp. 362-386. See also R.O. Keohane, “Nominal democracy? 
Prospects for democratic global governance,” International Journal of Constitutional Law, n° 13, 
2015, pp. 343-353. The examInation of the different conceptions of democracy is particularly 
relevant in those countries, which had experienced a dramatic change of regime, such as South 
Africa. For an assessment of the conceptions of democracy in the South African constitutional 
context, see T. Roux, “The Principle of Democracy in South African Constitutional Law”, in: S. 
Woolman and M. Bishop (eds.), Constitutional Conversations, Pretoria University Law Press, 
Pretoria, 2008, pp. 79-96; P. de Vos and W. Freedman (eds.). South African Constitutional Law in 
Context, Oxford University Press Southern Africa, Cape Town, 2014, p. 85 et seq. 
3
 J. C. Reitz, “How to Do Comparative Law”, The American Journal of Comparative Law, n° 46, 
1998, p. 622. 
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economic and political contexts. These are indeed in a fluid state, and the challenges the 
state-society institutional interface has to cope with are even more remarkable. On the 
one hand, these challenges are the outcome of a political deficit; on the other, global 
financial dominance is governed by international financial actors that have neither 
democratic nor popular legitimacy; furthermore, there is a lack of accountability in how 
they oversee financial governance
4
. Finally, nation states are in a state of flux, and 
instability is accrued by the presence of fragmented plural societies within which global 
mobilisation, labour migration movements, and economic freedom of the movement of 
capital and goods generate even sharper cross-cutting cleavages in the intersections of 
law, governance, and societies
5
. 
The current financial crisis has also caused a shift from the political to the economic 
sphere
6
. For instance, it has narrowed the discretion the political branches are entitled to 
when it comes to determining the destination of revenue to be raised throughout the 
country. As national governments have to pay off the public debt, a limited amount of 
proceeds now ensure minimum standards of income, health, education, and welfare, as 
well as the possibility for all citizens to enjoy comparable services. This threatens 
proposals for innovative structures made by the various political branches, and weakens 
the ability of political actors to manage the complex interweaving stemming from the need 
for social entitlements, governmental change, and the respect for the democratic 
framework. And the threats are even more contentious if we consider how global 
terrorism is now menacing liberal democracy, mobilisation, and pluralism, i.e., the same 
presuppositions that both constitutional democracy and global governance are based on
7
.  
                                                          
4
 See further J. Bohman, Democracy across Borders. From Démos to Dêmoi, The MIT Press, 
Cambridge (MA) and London, 2007, pp. 2-3. See also J.A. Frieden, “Invested interests: the politics 
of national economic policies in a world of global finance”, International Organization, n° 45, 1991, 
pp. 425-451; T.-C. Cheng, “Power, Authority and International Investment Law”, American 
University International Law Review, n° 20, 2005, pp. 465-520; P. Zapatero, “Searching for 
Coherence in Global Economic Policymaking”, Penn State International Law Review, n° 24, 2006, 
pp. 595-627. 
5
 E. Schwella (ed.), South African Governance, Cape Town: Oxford University Press Southern 
Africa, 2015, 128 et seq. 
6
 T.-C. Cheng, “Power, Authority and International Investment Law”, p. 469; J. Bohman, 
Democracy across Borders, p. 3. The assumption has been recently challenged by scholars: see D. 
Chalmers et al. (eds), The End of the Eurocrats’ Dream: Adjusting to European Diversity, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2016. 
7
 See K. Roach, “Comparative Counter-Terrorism Law Comes of Age”, in: K. Roach (ed.), 
Comparative Counter-Terrorism Law, Cambridge University Press Cambridge et al., 2015: pp. 1-48; 
R.O. Keohane, “Nominal democracy?”, 345 et seq. On the international state of flux triggered by 
terrorism see, among political philosophers, A. Cavarero, Horrorism. Naming Contemporary 
Violence, Columbia University Press, New York, 2009, 66 et seq. 
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II. FROM CONSTITUTIONAL TO THEORETICAL DEMOCRACY: COMPARATIVE 
STUDIES AND INNOVATIVE INSTITUTIONS 
There are practical reasons for choosing to focus on the theoretical presuppositions of 
constitutional democracy. When assessing institutional innovation, state constitutions 
reveal a great deal of variation: both the process of naming democratic designs and the 
forms they take are indeed extremely differentiated according to the different 
constitutional contexts
8
. This is particularly apparent when constitutional designs 
incorporate -that is, contextualise- theoretical conceptions of democracy. 
I do not underestimate what scholars term as the “Montesquiean tradition”
9
. 
Paraphrasing Tushnet, my intent is to highlight how each country’s choice of a specific 
constitutional democratic design merely reflects which is the country’s understanding of 
the theoretical conceptions of democracy. Indeed, that understanding contextualises such 
conceptions by taking into account the country’s politics and culture
10
. 
This constitutional understanding unavoidably affects leadership that, at various 
degrees and acting upon a political mandate, promotes institutional innovation. Indeed, 
“pluralisation and contextualization of models of democracy … allows us to recognize 
variation in the meaning and scope of democratic politics”
11
. 
When it comes to comparing this variety of names and forms, the analysis gives rise 
to the following questions: does linguistic variation really reflect a variety of forms? Does 
this cross-referential constitutional vocabulary entail differentiated concepts? Or, as I 
contend, does it merely “confound the language [of constitutions], [such] that they may 
not understand one another’s speech?”
12
. 
The three passages I quoted above also support the method I will apply throughout 
the essay, i.e., a method that comes out of comparative legal studies and that has proven 
                                                          
8
 P.C. Schmitter and K. Terry Lynn, “What Democracy Is ... and Is Not”, Journal of Democracy, n° 
2, 1991, pp. 3-16; M. Kurki, “Democracy and Conceptual Contestability”, p. 370 et seq.; M. Tushnet, 
Advanced Introduction to Comparative Constitutional Law, Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham-
Northampton, 2014, pp. 5-6. 
9
 I.e., the “idea propounded most eloquently by Montesquieu—that each nation’s laws reflected 
and embodied something distinctive about that nation’s “spirit” or culture—[and that] dominated the 
thinking of legal scholars” (M. Tushnet, Advanced Introduction, p. 2 fn 3). 
10
 M. Tushnet, Advanced Introduction, p. 4. 
11
 M. Kurki, “Democracy and Conceptual Contestability”, p. 377. 
12
 Ge. 11, 7, in: King James Version (1611), The Holy Bible Containing the Old and New 
Testaments Translated out of the Original Tongues and With the Former Translations Diligently 
Compared and Revised by His’ Majesty Special Command, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2006, 10. 
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to be extremely useful in cross-national analyses
13
. Comparative legal studies are usually 
entrusted with the goal of dealing with the variety of forms and naming that characterise 
the constitutional reflections of the theoretical foundations of constitutional democracy, 
complexity, and institutional innovation. On the one hand, these studies contribute to 
filling in the gaps between “black-letter law and rules ‘in action’’’ of democratic designs
14
. 
On the other hand, this method makes it possible to examine a vast array of 
constitutional regimes and operational rules, and therefore to propose classifications that 
are the outcome of a cross-national analysis. Comparative legal scholars are indeed 
accustomed to examining a vast array of constitutional forms (i.e., reflections of the 
theoretical concept of democracy), to grouping them on the grounds of their common 
traits, and to devising “prescriptive models”, which are “a synthesis of complexity by 
logical categories” that are useful for the advancement of comparative legal studies
15
. 
The comparative method thus exhibits an impressive ability to deal with legal 
complexity; furthermore, it proves to accomplish the goal of accommodating the variety of 
democratic forms and to shed light on the interrelationship between the theoretical types 
of democracy (deliberative, conversational, representative, economic) and their 
constitutional implications, under which governance of complexity is attained and 
institutional transition takes place. From this, however, it does not follow that this method 
is aimed at reducing and oversimplifying this variety; by contrast, it is capable of 
comparing and contrasting different constitutional democracies, of detecting analogies 
and differences between them.  
This means that the comparative method presupposes both legal (the constitutional 
frameworks as reflections of theoretical conceptions of democracy) and linguistic 
variation, both of which express contextualised democratic forms. Hence, legal and 
linguistic variation cannot be considered an obstacle to comparative studies. The method 
indeed allows scholars to get beneath linguistic labels and detect the commonalities upon 
                                                          
13
 J. C. Reitz, “How to Do Comparative Law”; L. Pegoraro, “The Comparative Method”, p. 117, 
126. 
14
 J.-L. Halpérin, “Law in Books and Law in Action: The Problem of Legal Change”, Maine Law 
Review,  n° 64, 2001, p. 47. The expression “law in action” was coined by the US jurist Roscoe 
Pound in 1910 and has since been applied by successive generations of scholars. See R. Pound, 
“Law in the Books and Law in Action”, America Law Review, n° 44, 1910, pp. 12-36. On the 
recourse to Pound’s categories by subsequent scholars see S. Macaulay, “Non-Contractual 
Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study”, American Sociological Review, n° 28, 1963, pp. 55-67. 
For a critique of Pound’s categories, see K.N. Llewellyn, “A Realistic Jurisprudence: The Next 
Step”, Columbia Law Review, n° 30, 1930, pp. 431-465. 
15
 R. David, Les grands systèmes de droit contemporains. Dalloz, Paris, 1974; R. Sacco, “A 
Dynamic Approach to Comparative Law (Installment I of II)”, The American Journal of Comparative 
Law, n° 39, 1991, pp. 1-34; R. Sacco, “A Dynamic Approach to Comparative Law (Installment II of 
II)”, The American Journal of Comparative Law, n° 39, 1991, pp. 343-402; L. Pegoraro, “The 
Comparative Method”, pp. 116-117; P.G. Monateri (ed.), Methods of Comparative Law: an 
Intellectual Overview, Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham-Northampton, 2012. 
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which variety may be grouped. The variety of languages, then, does not confound the 
interpreter: paraphrasing Shakespeare’s Romeo and Juliet, “That which we call 
democracy by any other name would perform the same function” (Shakespeare, II, ii, 1-
2). 
What makes this possible is the so-called functional approach
16
, which goes beyond 
specific constitutional designs characterising single democratic regimes: in Reitz’s words: 
Thus a good comparative law study should normally devote substantial effort to 
exploring the degree to which there are or are not functional equivalents of the 
aspect under study in one legal system in the other system or systems under 
comparison. This inquiry forces the comparatist to consider how each legal system 
works together as a whole. By asking how one legal system may achieve more or 
less the same result as another legal system without using the same terminology or 
even the same rule or procedure, the comparatist is pushed to appreciate the 
interrelationships between various areas of law
17
. 
Instead of focusing on variation, the legal comparative approach centres on the 
function democracy displays under different constitutional frameworks: indeed, 
“[i]nstitutions, both legal and non-legal, even doctrinally different ones, are comparable if 
they are functionally equivalent, if they fulfill similar functions in different legal systems”
18
. 
The search for commonalities and analogies may be useful when highlighting 
borrowings, the evolution of specific constitutional contexts, as well as their transplants
19
. 
And this article will examine how the dissemination of theoretical conceptions of 
democracy, as well as their incorporation and subsequent adaptation in constitutional 
designs, take place.  
However, devising prescriptive models does not support the homogenisation-
unification of these diverse solutions adopted under different constitutions. I have already 
contended that comparative legal studies presuppose linguistic and legal variation; 
furthermore, the functional approach encourages the practice of “comparative law as a 
                                                          
16
 On the functional approach in comparative legal studies see K. Zweigert, H. Kötz, An 
Introduction, p. 33 et seq.; R. Michaels, “The Functional Method of Comparative Law”, in: M. 
Reimann and R. Zimmermann (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 2006, pp. 339-382; M. Siems, Comparative Law, p. 25 et seq.; J. Husa, A New 
Introduction, p. 118 et seq. 
17
 J. C. Reitz, “How to Do Comparative Law”, p. 621. 
18
 R. Michaels, “The Functional Method of Comparative Law”, p. 340. 
19
 A. Watson, Legal Transplants: An Approach to Comparative Law, The University of Georgia 
Press, Athens (GA), 1993; D. Berkowitz et al., “The Transplant Effect” The American Journal of 
Comparative Law, n° 51, 2003, pp. 163-203. 
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subversive discipline”
20
. The subversive character of comparative studies reveals the 
fallacy of the presence of “new universals” in what has become a globalised world
21
 and 
therefore shows how legacies and transplants exhibit an elevated degree of resilience in 
contexts that act as mere recipients of transplanted solutions in the field of constitutional 
democracy. 
From this, however, it does not follow that democracy cannot be a new universal per 
se. It is evident that this typical Western conception has become “one of the world’s new 
universal religion[s]”
22
. This trend is even more apparent if only we consider how financial 
international actors “spread the word” by promoting democracy as an “emerging right to 
democratic governance”
23
. 
III. COMPARATIVE LEGAL STUDIES, THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK, AND 
PARADIGMS OF INSTITUTIONAL INNOVATION 
I come now to the three quotations with which the essay begins. Although they seem 
to be extremely differentiated on the grounds of both their sources and meaning, it is 
possible to get beneath linguistic labels and grasp the commonalities among them. 
The functional approach, which has proven to be extremely useful in comparative 
legal research, highlights their common traits: to varying degrees, the three passages 
may be considered metaphors or paradigms of institutional change. They embody the 
patterns through which it is possible to promote and govern complex societies by 
encouraging changes and ameliorations of the institutional setting. Furthermore, they 
focus on the role of the actors (the leadership) that promote institutional change; they also 
shed light on what I term the “paradigm shift”, i.e., on how leadership affects institutional 
change and therefore has an impact on the legal features that reflect the different 
theoretical conceptions of constitutional democracy. 
The passage from the Gospel provides us with an extensive paradigm for institutional 
innovation. Paraphrasing it, the text reads as follows:  
And I [the theoretical model of constitutional democracy] say also unto thee, 
Thou art Peter [leader/institutional innovator], 
                                                          
20
 G. Fetcher, “Comparative law as a Subversive Discipline”, American Journal of Comparative 
Law, n° 46, 1998, pp. 683-700; H. Muir Watt, “Further terrains for subversive comparison: the field 
of global governance and the public/private divide”, in: P.G. Monateri (ed.). Methods of 
Comparative Law, pp. 270-288. 
21
 H. Muir Watt, “Further terrains for subversive comparison”, p. 272. 
22
 P.E. Corcoran, “The Limits of Democratic Theory” in: G. Duncan (ed.). Democratic Theory and 
Practice, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1983, p. 14.  
23
 T. M. Franck, “The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance”, The American Journal of 
International Law, n° 86, 1992, p. 50. 
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And upon this rock [constitutional democracy] 
I will build [or innovate] my church [reflections of constitutional 
democracy/society];  
And the gates of hell [a different regime/rule] 
Shall not prevail against it [constitutional limitations]. 
When promoting transition/innovation in complex societies, i.e., in societal contexts 
that are extremely pluralistic, polarised, and divided along cultural, social, and religious 
cleavages even within state boundaries, this paradigm sets the principles (theoretical 
conception of democracy) to which the legal framework as established, implemented, or 
innovated by the leadership should adhere. 
The leadership is then the actor that governs societal complexity, and therefore aims 
to promote its transition by accommodating its cross-cutting cleavages. However, the 
paradigm both promotes change and sets limitations on innovation. This is apparent as 
far as the role of leadership is concerned. Which types of institutional innovation should 
the leadership propose? Should it act consistently with the conception of democracy that 
the legal framework presupposes? Or is it allowed to suggest 
implementations/innovations that go beyond the legal reflections of the theoretical 
conception of democracy? 
The paradigm lays down both procedural and substantive limitations on innovative 
institutional change. However multifaceted the society may appear and tremendous the 
innovations may be in order to cope with complexity, the leadership should propose 
changes that are not only consistent but also coherent with the original conception of 
democracy that it is incorporating. This is the reason why I primarily focus on the 
theoretical framework and therefore term constitutional designs “reflections” of the 
theoretical conception of democracy. In fact, the constitutional system is democratic not 
only because it is implemented throughout manifold forms of democracy but also because 
these forms are coherent with the theoretical foundations promoting institutional change, 
thus revealing the democratic character as inherent to the same constitutional system.  
However, the paradigm we infer from the Gospel gives rise to the following issues. 
Although it imposes on leadership the requirement to act consistently with the original 
conception of democracy, it does not clarify which are the original theoretical foundations 
that reveal the democratic character of its constitutional reflections.  
Furthermore, it does not explain which types of transition/change patterns the 
paradigm refers to. In particular, the concept of transition is not formulated clearly 
enough, and greater precision is therefore necessary. From the paradigm, we do not infer 
whether innovation merely consists in the governance of transition from authoritarian rule 
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to a democratic regime -and therefore only deals with the establishment of constitutional 
democracy in emergent democracies- or whether the concept encompasses all the 
changes that Western democracies are currently experiencing (in structures, policies, 
values, and decision-making processes) because of the economic crisis and global 
financial dominance. In this regard, the crisis gives rise to issues that are related to global 
economic governance. Hence, international financial actors such as the World Bank and 
the International Monetary Fund
24
, as well as private-sector investors, endorse the 
transformation of the legal and economic premises of constitutional democracy by 
promoting stringent budgetary policies and the narrowing of the welfare state: 
“Transnational and transgovernmental elite networks can play valuable roles in world 
politics, but they do not constitute democracy in the classic sense”
25
. Furthermore, such 
transformation of democracy proposes 
The division of labor and political delegation of authority that produces a 
proliferation of principal/agent relationship in which agents govern citizen-principals 
in many areas of life. Certainly, large areas of economic life, from the Federal 
Reserve to the International Monetary Fund, show this reversal of agency where 
the terms of the relationship are dictated by the agent rather than by the principal
26
. 
In both cases, the Gospel paradigm fails to clarify how the paradigm shift works. In 
particular, it does not shed light on how leadership interacts with the theoretical 
presuppositions of constitutional democracy and its reflections under specific 
constitutional designs or on how leadership interprets both constitutional values vis-à-vis 
constitutional limitations to proposed innovative designs. Indeed, the Gospel paradigm 
merely designates the leader as the principal interpreter of the conception of democracy 
that lies beneath the constitutional legal framework he or she governs. Furthermore, its 
shift entails conversational, mutual interaction between the leadership and the 
constitutional framework, but it does not explain whether such interactions take place in 
the constitutional scenario. 
                                                          
24
 It is “remarkable” that the institutions of the World Bank Group “have reached their present 
status as the premier source of both development finance and economic research and information 
without introducing any major change in their constituent charters” (I.F.I. Shihata et al. (eds.). The 
World Bank in a Changing World. Selected Essays, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht et 
al.1991, p. 15). 
25
 R.O. Keohane, “Nominal democracy?”, p. 344. See Section 8 below. 
26
 J. Bohman, Democracy across Borders, pp. 7-8. 
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IV. TYPES OF DEMOCRACIES, THE ROLE OF THE LEADERSHIP, TYPES OF 
TRANSITIONS 
We come now to the second and third quotations with which the essay begins. Both 
passages help us clarify the types of democracies, the role of the leadership, and the 
types of transitions the paradigm of innovation is built upon. 
1. What is hinted at in the Gospel paradigm? Liberal democracy as the type of 
democracy  
The type of democracy may be easily inferred by the second passage quoted in the 
beginning of the essay, which lays down the so-called Copenhagen criteria, which are 
now enshrined in Article 2 of the EU Treaty and that set precise legal requirements 
governing the complex transition for the admission of new states into the European 
Union. Furthermore, these Articles set of constitutional constraints upon national 
leadership: it cannot promote any constitutional change if such change, pursuant to 
Article 7 TEU, might trigger “those clear risk of a serious breach by a Member State of the 
values referred to in Article 2”
27
. 
The principles set forth therein (stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy; the 
rule of law; human rights; respect for, and protection of, minorities; the existence of a 
functioning market economy; and the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and 
market force within the Union) refer to the prototypical Western conception of democracy, 
ie, “the liberal democratic model of democracy”
28
. To this extent, these principles are 
constitutional reflections of the theoretical conception of liberal democracy: “the classical 
nineteenth-century balance of power system” is “dominated by constitutional 
democracies, notably the United States and member states of the European Union, which 
requires democracy as a condition of accession”
29
. And 
When global financial dominance promotes a paradigm for innovation, the proposed 
paradigm usually coincides with that of liberal democracy: “the one thing that has been 
almost completely absent from the 50 or so cases of attempted democratization since 
1974 is experimentation beyond the basic institutions of liberal democracy”
30
. As the 
                                                          
27
 See European Council, Presidency Conclusions European Council, 21-22 June 1993. 
Copenhagen. Denmark. http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_DOC-93-3_en.htm?locale=en 
(Accessed 9 May 2017). See H.-J. Blanke, “Article 2 [The Homogeneity Clause]”, in: H.-J. Blanke 
and S. Mangiameli (eds.), The Treaty on European Union (TEU). A Commentary, Springer, Wien et 
al., 2013, pp. 109-155. 
28
 M. Kurki, “Democracy and Conceptual Contestability”, p. 365. 
29
 R.O. Keohane, “Nominal democracy?”, p. 344. 
30
 P. Schmitter, “More Liberal, Preliberal, or Postliberal”, Journal of Democracy, n° 6, 1995, p. 16. 
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passage from the above-quoted World Bank report suggests, rule of law, political 
accountability, efficient governmental action, protection of fundamental rights, and a 
market economy are both presuppositions and reflections of liberal democracy. 
Government is thus legally limited in its powers, and its authority or legitimacy depends 
on its observing these limitations, which also constrains its ability to promote legal and 
institutional change. 
This is particularly apparent when it comes to decision-making processes: reflections 
of liberal democracy traditionally rest on representative government, i.e., a system of 
governance where indirect forms of participation in political decision-making processes 
are predominant, and where the political leadership acts as the constitutional leadership, 
i.e., it is constrained by the constitutional limitations on the exercise of its powers, which it 
must observe. 
Finally, the World Bank report upholds that liberal democracy perfectly fits the new 
universal of global economic and financial dominance: “[i]ndeed, Western liberal 
democracies have acted together to construct the current system that enables the global 
economy to operate”
31
. Liberal democracies are thus “the only viable societal model left, 
for only they are compatible with economic success and [the] rapidly integrating 
information-intensive world economy”
32
.  
2. Which role for leadership in the Gospel paradigm? 
Liberal democracy also sheds light on the role leadership plays under constitutional 
and democratic regimes. The role of the leadership is particularly relevant because it 
promotes changes in governmental structures, and accommodates such changes to the 
social and political contexts
33
. 
However, liberal democracy thus tends to reduce the leadership’s ability to manoeuvre 
and to narrow the applicability of the paradigm shift. The representative character of the 
liberal democratic system thus influences the same degree of institutional innovation.  
This holds true as far as participatory and deliberative “democracies” are concerned. 
Under constitutional democracy, liberal democracy governs the relations between 
different kinds of democracy
34
. 
                                                          
31
 J. Bohman, Democracy across Borders, p. 28. 
32
 M. Kurki, “Democracy and Conceptual Contestability”, p. 366. 
33
 For an overall examination, see R.O. Keohane, Keohane, Thinking About Leadership, 
Princeton University Press, Princeton (NJ), 2010. 
34
 B. Wampler, “When Does Participatory Democracy Deepen the Quality of Democracy? 
Lessons from Brazil”, Comparative Politics, n° 41, 2008, p. 70. 
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The “representative government-liberal democracy” equation is coherent with the 
Gospel paradigm, whereby the church in Greek indeed refers to an assembly or 
congregation (hence representatives), as it tends to exclude patterns of innovation that 
rest only on mechanisms of direct citizen participation (observations, civil juries, panels, 
public investigations, etc.), and totally depart from representative government. This is due 
to the fact that liberal-representative democracy implies, at its heart, that citizens elect 
their representatives, who in turn govern on their behalf. As Jeffrey Sachs J argued in 
Doctors for Life International v Speaker of the National Assembly and Others: 
Representative democracy undoubtedly lies at the heart of our system of 
government, and needs resolutely to be defended. Accountability of Parliament to 
the public is directly achieved through regular general elections. Furthermore, we 
live in an open and democratic society in which everyone is free to criticise acts 
and failures of government at all stages of the legislative process. Yet the 
Constitution envisages something more
35
. 
Liberal democracy is thus representative-oriented
36
, and the juridical effects of 
participatory mechanisms require the previous consent of the constitutional leadership 
when processing the results of participation in public authority. 
If this is the case, constitutional reflections of democracy do not create any conflict 
between deliberative, representative, and participatory democracy
37
. 
Representative democracy is even more predominant when it comes to deliberative 
democracy, which presupposes a model in which deliberation, through argumentation 
and persuasion, gives way to the broadest consent possible in public decisions. 
Evidently, when applied to representative democracy, deliberation aims to establish 
qualified majorities, not only in constitutional legislation or reform but also in the ordinary 
legislation
38
.  
In summary, with reference to participatory and deliberative “democracies”, the 
different mechanisms of citizen participation require previous consent when processing 
the results of participation in public authority.  
                                                          
35
 (CCT12/05) [2006] ZACC 11; 2006 (12) BCLR 1399 (CC); 2006 (6) SA 416 (CC) (17 August 
2006), para 46. 
36
 See below, para V. 
37
 P. de Vos and W. Freedman (eds.). South African Constitutional Law in Context, p. 95; M. 
Nicolini, “Theoretical Framework and Constitutional Implications: Participatory Democracy as 
Decision-Making in Multilayered Italy”, in: F. Palermo, E. Alber (eds.). Federalism as Decision-
Making. Changes in Structures, Procedures and Policies, Brill - Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 2015, 
p. 440. 
38
 R. E. Goodin, “Democratic Deliberation Within”, Philosophy & Public Affairs, n° 29, 2000, pp. 
81-109. 
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3. Which kind of transition? 
The paradigm shift is even more apparent in the third passage, which refers to Africa’s 
development problems: the crisis of governance is the crisis of political leadership that 
operated as constitutional leadership under a constitutional regime. Political leadership is 
not able to promote, under the guise of constitutional leadership, the exercise of political 
power to manage a nation’s affairs.  
This passage endorses the following assumption: the role of leadership should always 
adhere to constitutional democracy. When assessing institutional innovation, proposed 
changes count as constitutional reflections of the theoretical conception of democracy. 
This is the major consequence of the legal application of such a theoretical conception: in 
fact, “constitutional democracy” designates a system of “genuine democracy”, according 
to which political decisions are taken in terms of the constitution. Indeed:  
Genuine democracy is responsive to the preferences of real human beings. It 
requires elections that hold elected leaders accountable to publics and other 
arrangements that hold non-elected leaders accountable to elected ones. It also 
requires an effective rule of law with protection of individual rights; the existence of 
a vibrant civil society whose discussions are heard throughout the polity; 
substantial governmental transparency and procedures to ensure that leaders 
defend their policies in public, along with some opportunities for confidential 
discussions to promote compromise
39
. 
Constitutions thus prescribe the terms and the conditions under which political 
decisions may be made. This means that innovative leadership is constrained by both 
procedural and substantive limitations set forth by constitutions
40
. This means that 
political leadership is a constitutional leadership in liberal democracies and may therefore 
only propose innovative change and solutions that are consistent with the values already 
incorporated in the constitution. 
Within the liberal democratic model, a paradigm shift is then considered a negative 
implication of how political leadership infringes the limitations set by constitutional 
designs. Political leadership fails because it proposes its own interpretation of the 
                                                          
39
 R.O. Keohane, “Nominal democracy?” p. 344.  
40
 See C.A. Kelbley, “Are There Limits to Constitutional Change? Rawls on Comprehensive 
Doctrines, Unconstitutional Amendments, and the Basis of Equality”, Fordham Law Review, n° 72, 
2004, pp. 1487-1536; R. Dixon and D. Landau, “Transnational constitutionalism and a limited 
doctrine of unconstitutional constitutional amendment”, International Journal of Constitutional Law, 
n° 13, 2015, pp. 606-638; T. Ginsburg and J. Melton, “Does the constitutional amendment rule 
matter at all?: Amendment cultures and the challenges of measuring amendment difficulty”, 
International Journal of Constitutional Law, n° 13, 2015, pp. 686-713. 
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constitutional framework instead of implementing the interpretation already enshrined in 
the constitution. In this regard, conflicts usually arise between national parliaments and 
the judiciary on issues related to judicial review. When it comes to the latter, indeed, it is 
quite evident that the real problem is constitutional interpretation. As Mark Tushnet has 
pointed out, the question arises: 
when Congress enacts a statute that, on one reasonable interpretation of the 
Constitution -Congress’s interpretation- is perfectly constitutional, and that, on 
another reasonable interpretation -the Court’s- is unconstitutional. Neither the 
supremacy clause nor the idea of a constitution superior to ordinary law […] tells us 
which reasonable view ought to prevail, and there are reasons grounded in 
democratic theory for thinking that Congress’s should
41
. 
Thus, the pendulum swings between two different provinces of reasonable 
constitutional interpretation. It could be argued these conflicts are physiological within 
constitutional designs
42
, and that political leadership supersedes constitutional leadership 
when it sets aside representative government: “politics becomes personalized, and 
patronage becomes essential to maintain power. The leadership assumes broad 
discretionary authority and loses its legitimacy. Information is controlled, and voluntary 
associations are co-opted or disbanded”
43
. 
Like the Copenhagen criteria, the World Bank report allows an alternative reading with 
regard to the role of constitutional leadership. Indeed, it suggests that political leadership 
may also play a positive role. Indeed, when socio-economic and political contexts are in a 
fluid state -this was the case both of African states and the then new democracies of 
Eastern Europe in the early 1990s
44
- the presence of a fragmented plural society should 
be governed by innovative structures, and the leadership may be capable of managing 
the complex interweaving stemming from the need for governmental change and respect 
for the democratic framework. 
                                                          
41
 M. Tushnet, The Constitution of the United States of America. A Contextual Analysis, Hart 
Publishing, Oxford and Portland (OR), 2009, p. 136. 
42
 F. Palermo and M. Nicolini, “Courts and the Legislator: Tensions and Influences in Norway and 
in a Comparative Perspective”, in: G. F. Ferrari (ed.), Two Centuries of Norwegian Constitution: 
Between Tradition and Innovation,  Eleven International Publishing, The Hague, 2015, p. 122. 
43
 World BankSub-Saharan Africa: from Crisis to Sustainable Growth. A Long-Term Perspective 
Study, The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank, Washington (DC), 
1989, p. 61. 
44
 See D. Epstein et al., “Democratic Transitions”, American Journal of Political Science, n° 50, 
2006, pp. 551-569; S. Bitar, A. F. Lowenthal (eds.), Democratic Transitions. Conversations with 
World Leaders, John Hopkins University Press, London, 2015. 
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Hence, institutional innovation should propose a public service that is efficient, a 
judicial system that is reliable, and an administration that is accountable to the public. 
This requires a strong role for the leadership that is not limited to the implementation of 
constitution-oriented policies, but that should also propose how to promote both the 
restoration of the liberal democratic model and to foster “a systematic effort to build a 
pluralistic institutional structure, a determination to respect the rule of law, and vigorous 
protection of the freedom of the press and human rights”
45
. 
It follows that institutional innovation refers to both the transition from authoritarian rule 
to a democratic regime and to those changes that Western democracies are experiencing 
in structures, policies, and core values. Undoubtedly, when governing transition, 
institutional innovation should primarily refer to the patterns of change in governmental 
structures and procedures of democracies, which should foster democratic participation in 
public affairs and the governance of complex societies. Such changes are required to 
meet the needs of the body politic in an age of anxiety characterised by the passing of 
state-centric structures and by the deficit of legitimisation in financially oriented global 
governance. 
V. THE REASON FOR INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE: FROM RATIONAL DICHOTOMY 
TO PLURAL DEMOCRACIES 
“The liberal democratic model undoubtedly has many virtues, not least in its normative 
and emancipatory qualities and its ability to foster stable political systems’ - and yet ‘still a 
doubt remains”
46
. Notwithstanding its predominance in Western democracies over the last 
two centuries, the liberal democratic model is not able to support all types of institutional 
change and innovation
47
. 
On the one hand, liberal democracy has its roots in the 17th-19th centuries and 
presupposes a homogeneous body politic, i.e., a political community where common core 
values (be they religious, class-based, cultural) are shared
48
. Societal homogeneity may 
be straightforwardly administered by liberal democracy, which is a type of government 
that relies completely on representative institutions. Representative democracy is indeed 
a type of governance where the members of a political community participate mainly 
                                                          
45
 World Bank, Sub-Saharan Africa,p. 61. 
46
 M. Kurki, “Democracy and Conceptual Contestability”, p. 364. 
47
 P. de Vos and W. Freedman (eds.). South African Constitutional Law in Context, p. 94. 
48
 See L. Ward, The Politics of Liberty in England and Revolutionary America, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 2004. See also A. Buratti, Western Constitutionalism, Giappichelli, 
Turin, 2016.  
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through elected representatives in the governance of their community
49
. Traditional liberal 
democracies presuppose that citizens elect their representatives, which in turn govern on 
their behalf. Such governance is possible due to the homogeneity of its body politic. 
Cleavages are mainly political and therefore mediated by political parties, and this 
mediation allows the political community’s interests and representatives’ interests to 
perfectly match
50
. 
Pluralistic contemporary societies lack such homogeneity. The governance of societal 
complexity -where the financial crisis threatens “social” minimum standards, the 
mobilisation of people and migrations accrue cross-cutting cleavages, terrorism menaces 
the governance of this complexity- is thus unattainable through representative 
government alone. The consequences are threefold. First, several countries (like Brazil 
and South Africa) have experienced different paths of democratisation in order to govern 
societal accommodation
51
, and innovative institutions are now enshrined in constitutional 
texts (among them, direct and participatory democracy)
52
. Second, such an innovative 
institutional strategy still presupposes the type of governance that falls under the umbrella 
of liberal democracy. As already mentioned, when proposing its own model of institutional 
innovation, the leadership governs that institutional innovation still narrows the scope of 
institutional change by merely complementing the dominant representative government 
with different forms of democracy (representative, direct, participatory). This is due to the 
fact that the sociopolitical context still operates as if it were homogeneous: institutional 
change must be consistent with the rationale of liberal-constitutional democracy, and 
political leadership should therefore act in accordance with the democratic principles 
embedded in the constitution.  
                                                          
49
 See G. Kateb, “The Moral Distinctiveness of Representative Democracy”, Ethics, n° 91, 1981, 
pp. 357-374; R. Dahl, Dilemmas of Pluralist Democracy, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1982, 
p. 11. See also B. Manin, The Principles of Representative Government, Cambridge University 
Press, New York, 1997. 
50
 See N. Urbinati (ed.), Representative Democracy. Principles and Genealogy, Chicago 
University Press, Chicago, 2006. 
51
 G. Smith, Democratic Innovations: Designing Institutions for Citizen Participation, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 2009. 
52
 See sections 59(1) and 118 South African Constitution. In particular, section 118(1) states as 
follows: “A provincial Legislature must facilitate public involvement in the legislative and other 
processes of the legislature and its committees”. See P. de Vos, W. Freedman (eds.), South African 
Constitutional Law in Context, p. 119 et seq. See also articles 11, 240 and 241 Constitution of 
Bolivia (2009); articles 1.1 and 45 Constitution of Ecuador (2009); articles 2, 6 and 7 Constitution of  
Nicaragua (as amended in  2014) See  A. Schilling-Vacaflor, “Bolivia’s New Constitution: Towards 
Participatory Democracy and Political Pluralism?”, European Review of Latin American and 
Caribbean Studies, n° 90, 2011, pp. 9-11; G. Álvarez, J. Vintró, “Nicaragua: claroscuros de la 
reforma constitucional de 2014”, Bloc de la Revista catalana de dret públic (accessed on 9 May 
2017). On India see T. Besley et al., “Participatory Democracy in Action: Survey Evidence from 
South India”, Journal of the European Economic Association, n° 3, 2005, p. 649-650 for the Gram 
Sabha -i.e. village meetings called by the elected local government (Gram Panchayat). 
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In this respect, liberal democracy alone cannot cope with the complexity of society, 
whose conflicts cannot always be resolved through the traditional channels of 
representative democracy. As US scholars were already arguing in the 1960s and 1970s, 
complexity and heterogeneity can be considered expressions of a “pluralistic 
sovereignty”, whose fragmentation has to be handled with innovative, non-traditional 
forms of democracy
53
. 
Traditional liberal democracies presuppose that citizens elect their representatives, 
which in turn govern on their behalf. Hence, indirect participation through elections and 
homogeneity in the social base make liberal democracy mainly majoritarian-oriented
54
, as 
in the case of the United States of America
55
. This is the main legacy that Burke, Mill and 
Dicey granted to this conception of democracy
56
: not only does democracy consist of the 
majority principle (and rule) for the governance of the societies, but the whole 
governmental and institutional framework is percolated by the majority principle. The 
frame of government is majoritarian-based; checks and balances and the reflections of 
deliberation and participation are counter-majoritarian: the broad majority that is required, 
for example, in the amending process, is a patent limitation on constitutional leadership
57
. 
And the assumption holds true if we consider the most radical conceptions of democracy, 
such as that Thomas Paine epitomised in his works: “representation and election’ are 
indeed established and conducted fot the public good
58
. 
                                                          
53
 According to C. A. Auerbach, “Pluralism and the Administrative Process”, Annals of the 
American Academy of Political and Social Science, n° 400, 1972: scholars urge the “extension of 
‘participatory democracy’ as the only way to restore the legitimacy of […] law-making and law-
implementing institutions”. See also H. Kaufman, “Administrative Decentralization and Political 
Power”, Public Administration Review, n° 29, 1969, pp. 6-7. 
54
 P.C. Schmitter and K. Terry Lynn, “What Democracy Is ... and Is Not”, p. 6. See also Lani 
Guinier, The Tyranny of the Majority: Fundamental Fairness in Representative Democracy, Free 
Press: New York, 1994. 
55
 R. W. Bennett, “Democracy as Meaningful Conversation”, Constitutional Commentary, n° 14, 
1997, p. 492 et seq.  
56
 E. Burke, “Speech to the Electors of Bristol”, 3 Nov. 1774, in: The Works of the Right 
Honourable Edmund Burke. 6 vols., Henry G. Bohn, London, 1854-1856 and Reflections on the 
Revolution in France (1790), Penguin Books: London, 2004; J. S. Mill, “Considerations on 
Representative Government”, in On Liberty and Utilitarianism and Other Essays, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 2015, pp. 181-405; A. V. Dicey, An Introduction to the Study of the Law of the 
Constitution (1885), MacMillan, London, 1959, 10th edn, p. 84. See A. Ryan, “Mill and Rousseau: 
utility and rights”, in: G. Duncan, (ed.), Democratic Theory and Practice, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press 1983: 39-57; R. W. Krouse, ‘“Classical” images of democracy in America: Madison 
and Tocqueville,’ in: G. Duncan (ed.), Democratic Theory and Practice, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 1983, pp. 58-78; D. Judge, Democratic Incongruities: Representative 
Democracy in Britain, Palgrave MacMillan, New York, 2014, p. 119. 
57
 See Section IV.3 above. 
58
 T. Paine, “Dissertation on the first principles of government”, in Rights of Man, Common Sense 
and Other Political Writings, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1995, pp. 388-389, 396 See also C. 
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This also entails that, during the political mandate, representatives may make 
decisions without taking into due account the community’s views: representatives are 
indeed supposed to represent the majority of the populace, and that majority of the 
populace would support such decisions. But does this assumption still hold true “during 
the intervals between elections”
59
 in societal contexts where differences and cleavages 
undermine societal homogeneity or where representatives are called on to face the dire 
effects of the crisis by adopting appropriate measures without taking into account the 
popular will -and the populace will probably bear the burden of these effects- thus 
disregarding the same constitutional democratic presuppositions? 
The role of the same constitutional adjudicators corresponds to the majoritarian style 
in liberal democracies. Indeed, the political branches perceive that the courts have a non-
majoritarian character, which is intrusive and anti-majoritarian, because judicial 
intervention overrides decisions that, in their view, have some democratic justification. As 
a result, physiological relations often turn into pathological tensions
60
.  
The conflict is obviously particularly problematic when parliaments override judicial 
rulings that declare statutory provisions unconstitutional by passing a constitutional 
amendment. In such cases, courts not only scrutinise constitutional amendments but also 
the constitution itself- and the role of the courts in going as far as to scrutinise such 
constitutional overruling can even be considered “supra-majoritarian”. Many courts can 
effectively exercise such oversight
61
; and they usually affirm their power (or even their 
duty) to scrutinise whatever piece of legislation adopted by parliaments they please, thus 
conferring upon themselves normative precedence even over those qualified majorities 
necessary for enacting constitutional amendments
62
. 
                                                                                                                                                               
E. Merriam, Jr., “Thomas Paine's Political Theories”, Political Science Quarterly, n° 14, 1899, pp. 
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59
 P.C. Schmitter, K. Terry Lynn, “What Democracy Is ... and Is Not”, p. 6. 
60
 F. Palermo, M. Nicolini, “Courts and the Legislator”, p. 124. 
61
 F. Palermo, M. Nicolini, “Courts and the Legislator”, pp. 122-124. 
62
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This entails that further reflection is required as far as the Gospel paradigm is 
concerned. This is an abstract model capable of adapting to different types of democracy 
whose legal implementation is even more relevant, as they outline the scenario within 
which the governance of complexity and institutional transition take place, and where 
actors and innovation face the challenges stemming from global financial dominance. 
To this extent, I propose a theoretical narrative that is an alternative to the traditional 
one, according to which we usually consider the relations between conceptions of 
democracy and constitutional democratic designs. This means that we have to abandon 
reasoning based on dualism and dichotomy, i.e., reasoning that philosophers would call 
“rational”. As Richard Rorty argues, “to be rational consists precisely in respecting the 
distinctions between the absolute and the relative, the found and the made, object and 
subject, nature and convention, reality and appearance”
63
.  
To put it another way, we have to abandon the rational idea that only those innovative 
designs that are consistent with (and are merely legal reflections of) the conception of 
liberal democracy are the only ones that are constitutionally compatible. Therefore, we 
have to accept that there is room left for different forms of democracy capable of 
managing complexity and coping with institutional transition. These forms are different 
from liberal democracy: they have frequently been applied in the course of constitutional 
history
64
, and are indeed modelled on specific experiences
65
. 
To this extent, deliberative democracy is an intriguing theoretical type of democracy. 
In fact, the process of evaluating pros and cons before taking a decision is considered to 
be the ideal deliberative model. After previous public discussion and an exchange of 
information among all interested parties, a deliberation, which is not aimed at influencing 
decision-making on the part of the public administration, is undertaken
66
: 
                                                          
63
 R. Rorty, Philosophy and Social Hope, Penguin Books, London, 1999, p. xiii. 
64
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In “discursive” or “deliberative” theories of democracy […] the point is to 
increase the quality of democratic judgments through widespread citizen 
participation in multiple public spheres, both within and between the institutions of 
state, economy and civil society
67
. 
Further theoretical reflections have focused on the relationship between deliberative 
and participatory democracy and their areas of application. However, this theoretical 
assumption indicates that, even though representative participatory and deliberative 
democracy share some relevant traits, the relationship between them occasionally raises 
the issue of determining the fields in which both methods (deliberative and participatory) 
are applicable. 
What I contend here is that there also are different conceptions of democracy that 
leadership can be based on when outlining the principles underpinning an innovative 
institutional design. I will deliver a brief sketch of such theoretical conceptions in the 
following paragraphs, thus highlighting how variety affects both the theoretical 
conceptions and their legal reflections. Democracies thus vary from one constitutional 
context to another: they reflect different theoretical types of democracy in which both 
social and political values and the role of the leadership change
68
. And “[t]his claim opens 
up the possibility that there are a variety of qualitatively different models of democracy 
available to us, none of which can be decisively proved correct or incorrect”
69
. 
The outcomes are manifold. First, escaping the dichotomy between rationalism (i.e., 
pure liberal democracy) and irrationalism (alternative types of democracy) may help to fill 
in the gaps between written provisions and the practice of law. In this respect, innovative 
designs are neither reflections nor divergent applications of the liberal prototype model of 
democracy, but rather constitutional implications of alternative democratic patterns
70
. 
Second, the functional approach that is typical in comparative constitutional studies 
permits us to examine a vast array of constitutional forms (i.e., reflections of different 
theoretical concepts of democracy) and allows us to group them on the grounds of their 
common traits. The alternative conceptions of democracy still exhibit an impressive ability 
to deal with legal complexity, because they are different declensions of the democratic 
forms that were elaborated within context of Western constitutionalism. 
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This sheds new light on the interrelations between theoretical types of democracy 
(deliberative, conversational, representative, economic) and their constitutional 
implications, under which governance of complexity is attained and institutional transition 
takes place. The comparative method does not, however, reduce variety; instead, it is 
capable of comparing and contrasting different constitutional democracies, of revealing 
analogies and differences between them.  
VI. NEW PATTERNS FOR INSTITUTIONAL INNOVATION: SOCIAL AND 
CONVERSATIONAL DEMOCRACY 
We come now to alternative conceptions of democracy. The socio-democratic 
conceptions that underpin the Western model of the welfare state may also be traced 
back to social democracy, which is lucidly epitomised by John Dewey’s and Richard 
Rorty’s “social hopes for “a classless, casteless, egalitarian society”
71
. 
Rorty upheld the anti-dichotomy (i.e., anti-Platonist) assumption that we referred to 
above: the rationalism-irrationalism dualism is inherent in his philosophical conceptions, 
which are termed pragmatism. This proves to be useful when going beyond the 
representative liberal democratic model. On the one hand, it does not rest on purely 
theoretical conceptions of democracy: “The American pragmatist tradition … has made a 
point of breaking down the distinction between philosophy, science and politics”
72
, and 
has overturned the “Cartesian-Lockean picture of a mind seeking to get in touch with a 
reality outside itself”, where the “Cartesian mind is an entity whose relations with the rest 
of the universe are representational rather than causal”
73
. This means that leadership 
should stop “thinking of words [constitutional designs] as representations” of a theoretical 
framework, and think of itself “as nodes of a causal network which binds the organism 
together with its environment” [the societal context], where institutional innovation shall 
apply. 
Furthermore, pragmatism “the philosophy of democracy”, which “substitutes the notion 
of a better human future for the notions of ‘reality’, ‘reason’ and ‘nature’”. Its realism 
stems from observation of the US constitutional reality: 
both pragmatism and America are expressions of a hopeful, melioristic, 
experimental frame of mind. I think the most one can do by way of linking up 
pragmatism with America is to say … [that] we can, in politics, substitute hope for 
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the sort of knowledge which philosophers have usually tried to attain. America has 
always been a future-oriented country, a country which delights in the fact that it 
invented itself in the relatively recent past
74
. 
The constitutional (i.e., democratic) character of social democracy is apparent when 
we consider that it has also had practical and historical applications. Just as pragmatism 
has been carved out of the U.S. constitutional reality, historical social democracy is 
inferred from the Putney Debates held before the English Civil War “between the elected 
representatives of the soldiers of the New Model Army (‘the Agitators’) and their officers 
(the ‘Grandees’) between 29 October and 1 November 1647” in Putney Church near 
London
75
. 
The Putney Debates are then even more relevant because they are the historical 
prototype of deliberative democracy. The text consists in the transcription of the debates 
made by Sir William Clarke
76
: this “is a key text for understanding the roots of the 
formulation of our modern concepts of democracy and liberalism, particularly because 
they appear to be the first recorded expression of demands for universal manhood 
suffrage within a representative system of government”
77
. 
To this extent, the Putney Debates highlight how radical political leadership made an 
effort to determine the best constitutional, democratic design, where the milieu of 
constitutionalism reached its more radical, but advanced, heights: among the proposals 
that were made for the governance of England with renewed institutions, the levellers 
referred to the idea of covenant as a “model of society”, to “equality of all citizens”, to the 
“salus populi and popular sovereignty”.
78
 There also were radical proposals, such as the 
extension of the franchise and of the qualifications for voting: this outlined a “model of 
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republicanism designed to provide genuine popular sovereignty and to have justified the 
right of common soldiers to defend their political interest”
79
.  
This leads to a democratic conception that is truly egalitarian: 
The poorest he that is in England hath a life to live as the greatest he; … I think 
[it] is clear that every man that is to live under a government ought to first consent 
to put himself under that government
80
. 
However, the Putney Debates were given alternative interpretations: Levy conceived 
of the levellers as “radical Whigs”, not “egalitarian democrats”
81
. On the one hand, this 
should have limited the innovative designs proposed by the political leadership and 
therefore undermine the project of overturning the traditional decision-making 
processes
82
. On the other hand, it implied a shift towards a narrative based on proprietary 
rights that is closer to the Lockean one rather than to egalitarianism. A kind of democracy 
that is intermediate between social democracy and liberal democracy and yet is capable 
of supporting and promoting innovative institutional changes that can accommodate 
popular sovereignty, “liberalism”, and the “possessive individualist” nature of John 
Lilburne, the prominent leader of the levellers:  
A theory of property whose purpose was to rationalize the market, encourage 
accumulation, and maximize economic efficiency would have been quite agreeable 
to the elimination of most customary rights in use
83
. 
The theoretical scenario in which governance of complexity and institutional transition 
take place is even more intriguing in conversational democracy, which is described in 
Michael Oakeshott’s The voice of poetry in the conversation of mankind (1958)
84
. In 
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Oakeshott’s political thought, aesthetics “defends poetry as one of the independent 
worldviews which constitute the character of modern experience”
85
. In this respect, the 
theoretical framework is opposed to the vulgar moralisation of art, and poetry and politics 
still have an intrinsic value of their own.  
Like Rorty’s pragmatism, aesthetics is non-dualistic since it does not match the 
rational tradition: there is not concern towards “desire and aversion, approval or 
disapproval, and ‘fact’ and ‘non-fact’”
86
. On the contrary, there is the presence of different 
voices (practice, science, poetry, philosophy), but this does not entail that the deliberative 
process does not have practical implications. There is an implicit strong political 
commitment in Oakeshott’s reflections: “There is no vita contemplativa; there are only 
moments of contemplative activity abstracted and rescued from the flow of curiosity and 
contrivance”
87
.  
This also means that there are no deliberate predetermined contents within the 
democratic constitutional context: Oakeshott’s deliberative process is the purest form of 
“conversation [that] may have passages of argument and a speaker is not forbidden to be 
demonstrative; but reasoning is neither sovereign nor alone, and the conversation itself 
does not compose an argument”
88
. 
Oakeshott’s theoretical framework seems to be extremely adequate in the complex 
societal context and when governing transitions: the conversational democratic model is 
indeed “pluralistic” and “participatory” and matches the needs of fragmented societies. 
The different voices of conversational democracy concur, to varying degrees, in shaping 
a model where “all utterance[s] should be relevant; but relevance in conversation is 
determined by the course of the conversation itself, it owes nothing to an external 
standard”
89
. 
VII. UNDERMINING DEMOCRATIC INNOVATION: STANDARDS, ECONOMIC 
DEMOCRACY, AND EXTERNAL LEADERSHIP PROMOTING SOCIAL CHANGE 
Whereas conversational democracy does not constrain the utterance to external 
standards, economic democracy -the last theoretical conception of democracy I will 
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examine- depends on such external standards. This last conception does trigger the role 
of leadership: unlike liberal, social, and conversational democracies, economic 
democracy does not promote any institutional change from within. The external pressure 
of economic models and actors causes a shift from the political to the economic sphere, 
which focuses on ‘the problem of allocative efficiency rather than [on] questions of 
stabilization and income redistribution’
90
. 
This is due to the fact that: 
the loci of power … originally centred in state bureaucracies and/or local 
communities and municipalities, have been gradually shifting to corporations, and 
more impersonally, to world markets, their power unleashed by free-trade ideology, 
information technology and economic de-regulation. In this dynamic process 
entailing the concentration of power in ever-fewer hands, companies make 
decision based not on the public good, but on their own need to survive in an 
unforgiving capitalist system. Pushed by debts to banks and shareholders to grow 
and maximize profits, they pander to and create ‘effective demand’ for spurious 
products, thus often missing real and basic needs in communities, if unbacked by 
purchasing power
91
. 
The external factors thus outline a new constitutional narrative where an ongoing 
economic but democratic process eclipses constitutional representative democracy, 
which is indeed eroded by economic forces. The crisis affects political democracy, 
leadership, societal complexity, and boosts the lack of accountability of the dominant 
global financial system. As a consequence, academics advocate “a system of checks and 
balances on economic power and support for the right of citizens to actively participate in 
the economy regardless of social status, race, gender, etc.”
92
. 
In this regard, the quest for innovative institutions should be based on the following 
“faces of economic democracies”
93
: monitoring of market mechanisms and corporate 
activities; moral and political support of social enterprises, limitations of the power of 
banks by reducing fractional reserve banking; reclaiming the commons, reframing of 
economic freedoms.  
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These mechanisms should counterbalance economic democracy. Indeed, they are a 
counter-model vis-à-vis global financial dominance, but they are also proactive, as they 
presuppose innovative institutions that allow the populace to get involved in decision-
making processes related to the (economic) common good. 
This economic and democratic counter-model is then a reaction to international 
investment law, which “shifts power and authority from states to investors, tribunals and 
other decision-makers”, and “[t]hese shifts produce outcomes that only partially support 
global policies”, as well as the transfer of power and authority to decision-makers who are 
not democratically accountable
94
. But such a shift also impacts the legal systems of the 
world: the euro-Atlantic legal tradition (or Western legal tradition
95
) is the dominant one, 
and, within it, the common law tradition prevails over the civil law legal tradition. This is 
due to the fact that the common law legal tradition is said to ensure elevated economic 
performance. This is a shift from the legal to the economic meaning of law, which also 
makes it possible to do “comparative law by numbers”
96
. On the one hand, there is the 
idea that: 
‘law matters’: legal institutions have an impact on economic growth. This is in 
tune with neoclassical law and economics, which is based essentially on the idea 
that law should be measured by the incentives it sets for welfare-maximizing 
conduct
97
. 
On the other, the Doing Business reports of the Word Bank, i.e., “cross-country 
comparisons including rankings of the attractiveness of different legal systems for doing 
business’”
98
 have led to the idea that it is possible to evaluate the economic performance 
of legal systems by applying quantitative methodologies and numeric indicators:  
The promise of evidence-based policy-making is that it is not only more 
objective and less prone to misuse, but also more transparent, more democratic, 
and more open to public debate than decisions taken by politicians and business 
leaders with references to qualitative forms of knowing
99
. 
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The shift from a legal to an economic conception of democracy as the constitutional 
organisation of the body politic is also a shift from government to governance. The 
constitutional reflections of democracy are then mere reflections of economic governance 
and adhere to an efficiency rule, which ensures institutional changes in order to have 
economic performance. 
VIII. THE LEXICON OF DEMOCRACY AND ITS CONSTITUTIONAL UPHEAVAL: 
TOWARDS A UNIVERSAL ECONOMIC DEMOCRATIC LANGUAGE? 
The same conception of democracy has been undergoing an even more remarkable 
shift that affects not only its constitutional reflections and operational rule but also the 
meaning of the principle in question. This is what linguists call “semantic change”
100
, as it 
impacts the lexical semantics of the legal language, i.e., the very function of government.  
We have already highlighted how the subversive character of comparative legal 
studies presupposes the complexity and diversity of (both linguistic and legal) forms. 
Furthermore, we have pointed out that the comparative method accommodates diversity 
by grouping this variety of forms because they are functionally equivalent, i.e., they fulfil 
similar functions in different legal systems
101
. The functional method reveals a fallacy in 
current research related to economic (financial and democratic) dominance. This fallacy 
does not concern the variety and heterogeneity of the forms such relations take under 
federal constitutions; it rather concerns the idea that there is “at the least a global legal 
language’ capable of expressing such variety and that ‘global legal language [is 
necessarily] based on economic models”
102
.  
Such a shift in semantics is due to the intrinsic feature of legal language: 
the language of laws and statutes is characterised by neutrality and generality; 
it avoids subjective and personal attitudes and strong regional marking, to ensure 
correct and unambiguous transmission of information it must be conservative in its 
choice of structure and lexis and hostile to stylistic variation’
103
. 
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And yet, these features “represent anonymous authority and power”
104
: external 
factors, such as economic ones, may thus challenge the meaning of the legal lexicon 
related to constitutional democracy, and therefore impose a new sense (the language of 
economics) on existing lexical items. 
How this change in meaning occurs is due to pressure from economic models, which 
focus on “the problem of allocative efficiency rather than [on] questions of stabilization 
and income redistribution”
105
. The process of semantic change affects existing lexemes 
because they adopt an additional meaning that complements the old one
106
. This entails 
a shift from “legal” to “economic” semantics, which is even more significant when the 
substitution of meaning is complemented by the substitution of words, i.e., when the 
economic lexemes replace legal jargon. In this regard, linguistic change seems to be a 
mere projection of the above-mentioned principle of global financial dominance, and 
expresses the “efficiency rule”, i.e., the optimisation of the allocation of goods, powers, 
responsibility, as well as the promotion of an equilibrium between the estimates of 
revenue and expenditures. 
Public finance budgetary policies are now economic reflections of constitutional 
economic democracy: constraints and limitations upon the leadership’s actions are thus 
set by external actors, which also establish new procedural and substantive limitations on 
democratic change. Indeed, if “constitutional (economic) democracy” merely designates a 
system of governance according to which political decisions are taken in terms of the 
constitution, economic democracy prescribes the terms and the conditions under which 
these decisions may be made. The public finance model is now setting a new scenario: 
the promotion of change is in the hands of the various political branches (internal 
leadership), but the effective implementation of reform depends on the economic 
situation. This is what is called “nominal democracy”: “Nominal democracy meets 
democratic standards on the surface and embodies the rhetoric of democracy, but lacks 
the content. Transnational and transgovernmental elite networks can play valuable roles 
in world politics, but they do not constitute democracy in the classic sense”
107
. 
Indeed, the role of the leadership is triggered by the current economic and financial 
crisis: in Europe, for instance, several EU member states have amended their 
constitutions and introduced therein the principle of balance between revenue and 
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expenditure
108
. This is an example of an external (or imposed) form of institutional 
innovation that limits the welfare democratic state, since economic budgetary policies 
enshrined by the constitutional reforms assure that the budgetary position of the member 
states is balanced or in surplus according to Article 136 Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (TFEU) and to the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in 
the Economic and Monetary Union (TSCG) signed in Brussels on 2 February 2010. In 
particular, international financial actors and global financial dominance suggest the 
adoption of a model capable of supporting a capitalist socio-economic model, but one 
that totally departs from the model of Soziale Marktwirtschaft (i.e., social market 
economy), which is enshrined in Article 3 of the TEU
109
. 
However, it could be argued that the economic shift entails the deletion of constructs 
purporting one of the main core values upon which constitutionalism was erected, that is, 
the idea of the supremacy of the same democratic constitutions: “The stability treaty not 
only requires … constitutional changes in each of the signatory states, but also raises 
significant questions about its relationship with EU law and the extent of the discretion left 
to member states to make fundamental decisions about taxation and spending”
110
. 
This change in the meaning of the paradigm for democratic innovations is threefold. 
First, there is a shift towards centralisation, and this reflects the anxiety towards the 
creation of a global legal language and common regulation of international financial 
relations and markets. Second, there is an even more remarkable shift towards the 
efficiency rule, whose application requires that, when funds and proceeds are allocated at 
different levels of government, the national level is financially responsible vis-à-vis 
financial markets and international investors. To put it differently, the national government 
is accountable as far as global economic governance is concerned. Third, global financial 
dominance causes a shift from the political to the economic sphere, and the leadership 
seems to rely on a new form of confidence between the political power and the sovereign 
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financial market, where the “distressed sovereign debt can be sold on private equity 
markets and the debtor [is] subjected to the harsh economics of private law”
111
.
 
It follows that there has been a complete overturn in how constitutional (economic) 
democracy handles societal complexity and promotes innovative institutions for its 
governance. The Gospel paradigm still holds true, but presuppositions, limitations, and 
goals of institutional innovation have profoundly changed (setting the democratic 
framework and governing complexity). Whereas the theoretical conception of liberal 
democracy could still be implemented by resorting to differentiated constitutional 
domestic designs, the efficiency rule now requires constitutional features that are 
common throughout the world. The theoretical conception and constitutional reflections 
now match under a unique type of democracy that ensures improved economic 
performance. This also means that society is experiencing a new homogeneity and that 
economic-oriented democracy is capable of managing (i.e., simplifying) the complex and 
multifarious relations between society, leadership, and transition/innovation under specific 
constitutional designs. 
Homogeneity now pervades the governmental structure: on the one hand, theoretical 
and constitutional conceptions of democracy match their societal reflections; on the other, 
homogeneity narrows the discretion of a leadership that is proposing innovative 
institutions. The devising of normative models supports the homogenisation-unification of 
these diverse solutions adopted under different constitutions, and this makes them 
prescriptive. This means that, in a globalised economic world, constitutional contexts act 
as recipients of the proposed policies in the field of constitutional economic democracy
112
. 
This is a constitutional upheaval that totally departs from what democracy and 
comparative legal studies presuppose: the sustainability of linguistic and legal variety and 
diversity. When economic democracy will definitely determine the meaning of the lexicon 
of constitutionalism, the limitation of powers and government of the body politic will then 
be based on a new economic democracy, and this will mean the time for new universals 
has come. 
Against this background, additional efforts in the practice of subversive comparison 
are required, and scholars should, whenever possible, oppose the change in legal lexical 
semantics, and warn against the application of economic principles to constitutional 
democracy and to the governance of the body politic. 
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